ARNOLD v. SOUTH CAROLINA - 467 U.S. 1265 (1984)
U.S. Supreme Court
ARNOLD v. SOUTH CAROLINA , 467 U.S. 1265 (1984)
467 U.S. 1265
John D. ARNOLD
John H. PLATH
Supreme Court of the United States
June 25, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 16, 1984.
On petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Petitioners were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed but the sentences were reversed due to an improper argument the prosecution made to the jury at the sentencing hearing. 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981). On remand, petitioners were again sentenced to death. They challenge that sentence on the ground that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the site of the murder without the presence of either the defense or the prosecution attorneys and also by making no arrangements to record what transpired at the jury- viewing. Petitioners claim that the trial court's action denied them their right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 ( 1963).
In rejecting petitioners' claim, the Supreme Court of South Carolina principally relied upon Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).* In Snyder this Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by excluding a defendant from an on-site inspection by a jury. Snyder, however, is inapposite to the case at bar. First, Snyder involved whether a defendant had the right to be present at an on-site inspection by a jury. Here, the issue is whether a defendant had the right to have his attorney present at such a viewing. Second, and more importantly, in Snyder the defendant's attorney was present and participated, along with the prosecutor, in directing the jury's attention to various aspects of the location under inspection by the jury. Id., at 103-104-332. Here, all attorneys were excluded. Third, in Snyder, "everything that was said or done was taken by the stenographer and made part of the record of the trial." Id., at 123-124-339 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Here, no record [467 U.S. 1265 , 1267]