Texaco, Inc. v. ShortAnnotate this Case
454 U.S. 516 (1982)
U.S. Supreme Court
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)
Texaco, Inc. v. Short
Argued October 6, 1981
Decided January 12, 1982
454 U.S. 516
The Indiana Dormant Mineral Interests Act, more commonly known as the Mineral Lapse Act, provides that a severed mineral interest that is not used for a period of 20 years automatically lapses and reverts to the current surface owner of the property, unless the mineral owner prior to the end of the 20-year period or within a 2-year grace period after the effective date of the Act (September 2, 1971) files a statement of claim in the local county recorder's office. The "use" of a mineral interest sufficient to preclude its extinction includes actual or attempted production of the minerals, payment of rents or royalties, and payment of taxes. The statute contains one exception to the general rule: if an owner of 10 or more mineral interests in the same county files a statement of claim that inadvertently omits some of those interests, the omitted interests may be preserved by a supplemental filing made within 60 days of receiving notice of the lapse. Appellants, whose unused mineral interests had lapsed upon expiration of the grace period under the Act, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in actions brought in Indiana state court. They claimed that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the lack of prior notice of the lapse deprived them of property without due process of law, the statute effected a taking of property for public use without just compensation, and the exception for owners of 10 or more mineral interests denied them the equal protection of the law. They also contended that the statute constitutes an impairment of contracts in violation of the Contract Clause. The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed.
1. The State has the power to enact the kind of statute in issue, and, in this instance, has not exercised this power in an arbitrary manner. Each of the actions required to avoid an abandonment of a mineral interest furthers the legitimate state goals of encouraging mineral interest owners to develop such interests and of collecting property taxes. Pp. 454 U. S. 525-530.
2. The Act does not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the State may treat as abandoned a mineral interest that has not been used for 20 years and for which no statement of claim has been filed, it follows that, after abandonment,
the former owner retains no interest for which he may claim compensation. It is the owner's failure to make any use of the property -- and not the State's action -- that causes the lapse of the property right; there is no "taking" that requires compensation. P. 454 U. S. 530.
3. Nor does the Act unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts. Since appellant mineral owners did not execute any coal and oil leases until after the statutory lapse of their mineral rights, the statute cannot be said to impair a contract that did not exist at the time of its enactment. While appellants' right to enter such an agreement has been impaired, this right is a property, not a contract, right. P. 454 U. S. 531.
4. The Act did not extinguish appellants' property without adequate notice in violation of their due process rights. Pp. 454 U. S. 531-538.
(a) The 2-year grace period provided by the statute forecloses any argument that the statute is invalid because mineral owners may not have had an opportunity to become familiar with its terms. Property owners are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of their property. Moreover, the greatest deference must be accorded to the judgment of state legislatures as to whether a statutory grace period provides an adequate opportunity for citizens to become familiar with a new law. Here, both the Indiana Legislature and the Indiana Supreme Court have concluded that the 2-year grace period was sufficient to allow property owners to familiarize themselves with the statute and to take appropriate action to protect existing interests. Pp. 454 U. S. 531-533.
(b) Given appellants' presumed knowledge that their unused mineral interests would lapse unless they filed a statement of claim, appellants had no constitutional right to be advised that the 20-year period of nonuse was about to expire. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,339 U. S. 306, distinguished. Since the State may impose on a mineral interest owner the burden of using that interest or filing a statement of claim, it follows that the State may impose on him the lesser burden of keeping informed of the use or nonuse of his own property. Pp. 454 U. S. 533-538.
5. Since the statutory exception for owners of 10 or more mineral interests furthers the legitimate statutory purpose of encouraging multiple ownership as being more conducive to the actual production of mineral resources, and has no adverse impact on persons like appellants who own fewer mineral interests, the exception does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 454 U. S. 538-540.
___ Ind. ___, 406 N.E.2d 625, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined,post, p. 454 U. S. 540.
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