U.S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVERNORS v. AIKENSAnnotate this Case
453 U.S. 902 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE BD. OF GOVERNORS v. AIKENS , 453 U.S. 902 (1981)
453 U.S. 902
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Louis H. AIKENS
No. 80- 1737
Supreme Court of the United States
June 29, 1981
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment, 642 F.2d 514, is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
At the behest of the Government, the Court today summarily vacates a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remands the case to that
court for reconsideration in light of our decision earlier this Term in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Because I regard this disposition as wholly inappropriate and unnecessary, I dissent.
Respondent Aikens is a retired Negro employee of the United States Postal Service. He filed this suit alleging that the Postal Service Board of Governors, petitioner here, had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., by discriminating against him because of his race with respect to the awarding of promotions and work details. The District Court, in dismissing the action, concluded that respondent had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown "that he was as qualified or more qualified than the individuals who were promoted." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the District Court's ruling was "[p]lainly . . . a misstatement of applicable law." 206 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 114, 642 F.2d 514, 519 (1980). The panel noted that even the petitioner had conceded that the District Court had mischaracterized the showing necessary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII. Ibid. The court concluded that this Court's controlling decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), required that a Title VII plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, show only that "he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants." Id., at 802. Accordingly, the case was remanded to [453 U.S. 902 , 904]