Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers UnionAnnotate this Case
446 U.S. 719 (1980)
U.S. Supreme Court
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980)
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
Argued February 19, 1980
Decided June 2, 1980
446 U.S. 719
Appellant Virginia Supreme Court, which claims inherent authority to regulate and discipline attorneys, also has statutory authority to do so. Pursuant to these powers, the court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and organized the Virginia State Bar to act as an administrative agency of the court to report and investigate violations of the Code. The statute reserves to the state courts the sole power to adjudicate alleged violations of the Code, and the Supreme Court and other state courts of record have independent authority on their own to initiate proceedings against attorneys. When one of the appellees sought to prepare a legal services directory, the attorneys who were canvassed refused to supply the requested information for fear of violating the Code's prohibition against attorney advertising (DR 2-102(A)(6)). Appellees then brought an action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, inter alios, the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief justice (also an appellant) in both his individual and official capacities, seeking a declaration that the defendants had violated appellees' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning the attorneys involved, and a permanent injunction against the enforcement and operation of DR 2-102(A)(6). Ultimately, after the Virginia Supreme Court declined to amend DR 2-102(A)(6) despite the State Bar's recommendation to do so and despite the intervening decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,433 U. S. 350, holding that enforcement of a ban on attorney advertising would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of attorneys seeking to advertise fees charged for certain routine legal services, the District Court declared DR 2-102(A)(6) unconstitutional on its face and permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing it. The court further held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which provides that, in any action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, inter alia, a district court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, authorized in proper circumstances
the award of fees against the Virginia Supreme Court and the chief justice in his official capacity, and that here such an award was not unjust because the Supreme Court had denied the State Bar's petition to amend the Code and had also failed to amend it to conform to the holding in Bates, supra.
1. In promulgating the Code, the Virginia Supreme Court acts in a legislative capacity, and in that capacity the court and its members are immune from suit. Pp. 446 U. S. 731-734.
2. But the court and its chief justice were properly held liable in their enforcement capacities. Since the state statute gives the court independent authority on its own to initiate proceedings against attorneys, the court and its members were proper defendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, just as other enforcement officers and agencies are. Pp. 446 U. S. 734-737.
3. The District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees against the Virginia Supreme Court premised on acts or omissions for which appellants enjoy absolute legislative immunity. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act to suggest that Congress intended to permit an award of attorney's fees to be premised on acts for which defendants would enjoy absolute immunity. Pp. 446 U. S. 737-739.
470 F.Supp. 1055, vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.