Durst v. United StatesAnnotate this Case
434 U.S. 542 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court
Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978)
Durst v. United States
Argued December 5, 1977
Decided February 22, 1978
434 U.S. 542
Petitioners, youth offenders, pleaded guilty to various federal offenses and, under § 5010(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), were given suspended sentences and placed on probation, which was conditioned on payment of fines and, in one instance, on making restitution. Their convictions were affirmed in the courts below. While now conceding that restitution is a permissible condition of probation under the YCA, petitioners contend that a sentence of probation under § 5010(a) is a substitute for any other penalty provision, and that, since § 5010(a) does not expressly authorize fines, the authority to impose them cannot be imputed from any other penalty provision. They argue, moreover, that a fine is necessarily punitive and contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the YCA.
Held: When a youth offender is placed on probation under § 5010(a), restitution may be required, and, when the otherwise applicable penalty provision permits, a fine may be imposed as a condition of probation. Pp. 434 U. S. 549-554.
(a) Though the language of § 5010(a) neither grants nor withholds the authority to impose a fine or to order restitution, § 5023(a) of the YCA incorporates by reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 ed.), to permit such an exaction, and it is clear from the YCA's legislative history that Congress' purpose in adopting § 5023(a) was to assure that a sentence under § 5010(a) would not displace the authority under § 3651 to impose a fine and order restitution as conditions of probation. Pp. 434 U. S. 549-553.
(b) In preserving the authority to impose a fine as a condition of probation Congress necessarily concluded that such a condition comports with YCA's rehabilitative goals. Pp. 434 U. S. 553-554.
549 F.2d 799, affirmed
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.