United States v. NASD, Inc.Annotate this Case
422 U.S. 694 (1975)
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975)
United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
Argued March 17, 1975
Decided June 26, 1975
422 U.S. 694
Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides that
"no dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus."
Section 22(f) authorizes mutual funds to impose restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of shares, provided they conform with the fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules and regulations that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may prescribe in the interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securities. Section 2(a)(6) defines a "broker" as a person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, and § 2(a)(11) defines a "dealer" as a person regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account. The Maloney Act of 1938 (§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) supplements the SEC's regulation of over-the-counter markets by providing a system of cooperative self-regulation through voluntary associations of brokers and dealers. The Government brought this action against appellee National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual fund underwriters, and broker-dealers, alleging that appellees, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, combined and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions, and sought to enjoin such agreements. Count I of the complaint charged a horizontal combination and conspiracy among NASD's members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the purchase and sale of mutual fund shares, the Government contending that such count was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD rules, but on NASD's interpretations and appellees' extension of the rules so as to include a secondary market. Counts II-VIII alleged various vertical restrictions on secondary
market activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that §§ 22(d) and (f), when read in conjunction with the Maloney Act, afforded antitrust immunity from all of the challenged practices. It further determined that, apart from this statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes conferred an implied immunity from antitrust sanction. The court concluded that the § 22(d) price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applied to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts as statutory "broker", rather than a statutory "dealer," and thus that § 22(d) governs transactions in which the broker-dealer acts as an agent for an investor as well as those in which he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account.
1. Neither the language nor legislative history of § 22(d) justifies extending the section's price maintenance mandate beyond its literal terms to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as statutory "brokers." Pp. 422 U. S. 711-720.
(a) To construe § 22(d) to cover all broker-dealer transactions would displace the antitrust laws by implication and also would impinge on the SEC's more flexible authority under § 22(f). Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system, and here no such showing has been made. Pp. 422 U. S. 719-720.
(b) Such an expansion of § 22(d)'s coverage would serve neither this Court's responsibility to reconcile the antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible nor the Court's obligation to interpret the Investment Company Act in a manner most conducive to the effectuation of its goals. P. 422 U. S. 720.
2. The vertical restrictions sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIII are among the kinds of agreements authorized by § 22(f), and hence such restrictions are immune from liability under the Sherman Act. Pp. 422 U. S. 720-730.
(a) The restrictions on transferability and negotiability contemplated by § 22(f) include restrictions on the distribution system for mutual fund shares as well as limitations on the face of the shares themselves. To interpret the section as covering only the latter would disserve the broad remedial function of the section, which, as a complement to § 22(d)'s protection against disruptive price competition caused by dealers' "bootleg market" trading of mutual fund shares, authorizes the funds and the SEC to deal more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices
by imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability and negotiability. Pp. 422 U. S. 722-725.
(b) To contend, as the Government does, that the SEC's exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming with § 22(f) misconceives the statute's intended operation. By its terms, § 22(f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations, and thus authorizes funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject to SEC disapproval. Pp. 422 U. S. 726-728.
(c) The SEC's authority would be compromised if the agreements challenged in Counts II-VIII were deemed actionable under the Sherman Act. There can be no reconciliation of the SEC's authority under § 22(f) to permit these and similar restrictive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they are illegal per se. In this instance, the antitrust laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established by the Investment Company Act is to work. Pp. 422 U. S. 729-730.
3. The activities charged in Count I are neither required by § 22(d) nor authorized under § 22(f), and therefore cannot find antitrust shelter therein. The SEC's exercise of regulatory authority under the Maloney and Investment Company Acts is sufficiently pervasive, however, to confer implied immunity from antitrust liability for such activities. Pp. 422 U. S. 730-735.
374 F.Supp. 95, affirmed.
POWELL, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 422 U. S. 735.
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