Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc. - 419 U.S. 186 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974)
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc.
Argued October 21-22, 1974
Decided December 17, 1974
419 U.S. 186
Respondent operators of a California "hot plant," at which asphaltic concrete for surfacing highways is manufactured and sold entirely intrastate, alleging violations of, inter alia, § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (hereafter § 2(a)), and §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, brought suit against petitioner liquid asphalt producers and two of their subsidiaries, to which such asphalt is sold and which use it to manufacture and sell asphaltic concrete in competition with respondents. Section 2(a) forbids "any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce" to discriminate in price "where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce" and the discrimination has substantial anticompetitive effects "in any line of commerce." Section 3 makes it unlawful "for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce" to make tie-in sales or enter exclusive dealing arrangements where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." And § 7 forbids certain acquisitions by a corporation "engaged in commerce" of the assets or stock "of another corporation engaged also in commerce" where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition "in any line of commerce in any section of the country." The District Court held that it had no jurisdiction of the claims because the market for asphaltic concrete is exclusively and necessarily local, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jurisdictional requirements of §§ 2(a), 3, and 7 were satisfied by the fact that sales of asphaltic concrete are made for use in interstate highways.
1. The fact that interstate highways are instrumentalities of commerce does not render petitioners' conduct with respect to a material sold for use in constructing these highways "in commerce" as a matter of law for purposes of §§ 2(a), 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125, and Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13, distinguished. Pp. 419 U. S. 193-199.
2. The "in commerce" language of the Robinson-Patman and Clayton Act provisions in question does not extend on an "effects on commerce" theory to petitioners' sales and acquisitions. Pp. 419 U. S. 199-203.
(a) In face of the longstanding judicial interpretation of the language of § 2(a) requiring that "either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination [be] in commerce," as meaning that § 2(a) applies only where "at least one of the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination . . . cross[es] a state line,'" Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 9; Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178, and the continued congressional silence on the subject, this Court is not warranted in extending § 2(a) beyond its clear language to reach a multitude of local activities hitherto left to state and local regulation. Pp. 419 U. S. 199-201.
(b) The "effects on commerce" theory, whereby §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act would be held to extend to acquisitions and sales having substantial effects on commerce, even if legally correct, fails here for want of proof, since respondents presented no evidence of effect on interstate commerce from the use of asphaltic concrete in interstate highways. Pp. 419 U. S. 201-203.
487 F.2d 202, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 419 U. S. 203. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 419 U. S. 204.