BUCKLEY v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS
419 U.S. 1093 (1974)

Annotate this Case

U.S. Supreme Court

BUCKLEY v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS , 419 U.S. 1093 (1974)

419 U.S. 1093

William F. BUCKLEY, Jr., et al.
v.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS.
No. 74-313.

Fulton LEWIS, III
v.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS.
No. 74-314.

Supreme Court of the United States

December 23, 1974

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1975.

See 420 U.S. 956.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

These cases, as I view them, present the issue of whether a person suffers an infringement of his First Amend-

Page 419 U.S. 1093 , 1094

ment rights when he is compelled to pay union dues (or their equivalent) as a precondition to expressing his ideas through a public broadcasting medium. [Footnote 1]

In Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), a union shop agreement authorized under the Railway Labor Act was challenged under the First and Fifth Amendments. While holding on the merits that a union shop requirement does not violate those Amendments, we held that the Railway Labor Act provision governing union shop agreements constitute sufficient governmental action to require consideration of the constitutional issues: '[T]he federal statute is the source of power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.' Id., at 232. We left open the possibility that a membership or dues requirement might, in some circumstances, be imposed in contravention of the First Amendment, though no such problem was presented on the record in that case.

In Hanson, governmental action was based on the Railway Labor Act, which provided that state 'right to work' laws were superseded and that a union shop agreement was permissible notwithstanding such laws. Id., at 231-232. Thus that federal Act placed 'the imprimatur of the federal law' upon union shop agreements. The Taft-Hartley Act (in contrast) authorizes union shop agreements only in the absence of contrary state law. 29 U.S.C. 164(b). Yet there still is a substantial argument in favor of a holding that a union shop agreement under the NLRA bears the imprimatur of federal law.

The fact that 8(a)(3)2 is phrased in permissive rather than mandatory terms would not, in and of itself, [419 U.S. 1093 , 1095]


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