WATKINS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, 418 U.S. 911 (1974)
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
WATKINS v. SOUTH CAROLINA , 418 U.S. 911 (1974)418 U.S. 911
Louis WATKINS
v.
State of SOUTH CAROLINA.
No. 73-1280.
Supreme Court of the United States
July 25, 1974
The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view that any state should be afforded a new trial under local community ban on obscenity is prohibited by the First
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth (see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), would note jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of conviction.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Appellant was convicted after a jury trial in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina (Darlington County) on charges of feloniously exhibiting an obscene motion picture film in violation of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 16-414.2 which provides:
'It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to send or cause to be sent, or to bring or cause to be
brought into South Carolina for sale or distribution, or to
prepare, publish, print, exhibit, distribute, or to offer to
distribute in the State, or to have in his possession with intent
to distribute, or to exhibit or to offer to distribute, any obscene
matter.'
As used in that section,
'(a) 'Obscene' means that to the
average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant
appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest
among which is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or
excretion, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters. If it
appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of
its dissemination that the subject matter is to be distributed to
minors under sixteen years of age, predominant appeal shall be
judged with reference to such class of minors.
'(b) 'Matter' means any book,
magazine, newspaper or other printed or written material or any
pic- [418 U.S. 911 ,
913]
Opinions
v.
State of SOUTH CAROLINA.
No. 73-1280. Supreme Court of the United States July 25, 1974 The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view that any state should be afforded a new trial under local community ban on obscenity is prohibited by the First Page 418 U.S. 911 , 912 Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth (see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), would note jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of conviction. Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting. Appellant was convicted after a jury trial in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina (Darlington County) on charges of feloniously exhibiting an obscene motion picture film in violation of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 16-414.2 which provides:
U.S. Supreme Court
WATKINS v. SOUTH CAROLINA , 418 U.S. 911 (1974) 418 U.S. 911 Louis WATKINSv.
State of SOUTH CAROLINA.
No. 73-1280. Supreme Court of the United States July 25, 1974 The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view that any state should be afforded a new trial under local community ban on obscenity is prohibited by the First Page 418 U.S. 911 , 912 Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth (see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), would note jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of conviction. Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting. Appellant was convicted after a jury trial in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina (Darlington County) on charges of feloniously exhibiting an obscene motion picture film in violation of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 16-414.2 which provides:
'It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to send or cause to be sent, or to bring or cause to be
brought into South Carolina for sale or distribution, or to
prepare, publish, print, exhibit, distribute, or to offer to
distribute in the State, or to have in his possession with intent
to distribute, or to exhibit or to offer to distribute, any obscene
matter.'
As used in that section,
'(a) 'Obscene' means that to the
average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant
appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest
among which is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or
excretion, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters. If it
appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of
its dissemination that the subject matter is to be distributed to
minors under sixteen years of age, predominant appeal shall be
judged with reference to such class of minors.
'(b) 'Matter' means any book,
magazine, newspaper or other printed or written material or any
pic-
Page 418 U.S.
911 , 913
ture, drawing, photograph, motion picture or other pictoral
representation or any statute [sic] or other figure, or any
recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical
reproduction or any other article, equipment, machine or
material.
'(c) 'Distribute' means to transfer
possession of, whether with or without consideration.
'(d) The word 'knowingly' as used
herein means having knowledge of the contents of the subject matter
or failing after reasonable opportunity to exercise reasonable
inspection which would have disclosed the character of such subject
matter.' Id., at 16-414.1.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, 259 S.C. 185,
191 S.E.2d
135 (1972). On appeal to this Court, the Judgment of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina was vacated and the case remanded
for reconsideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 ( 1973). On
remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina again affirmed the
conviction.
It is my view that 'at least in the absence of distribution to
juvenile or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal
Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented
materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.'
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since it is clear
that, when tested by that constitutional standard, the word
'obscene' in 16-414.1 and 16-414.2 is unconstitutionally overbroad
and therefore facially invalid, I disagree with the holding that
the appeal does not present a substantial federal question, and
therefore dissent from the Court's dismissal of the appeal.'*
Page 418 U.S.
911 , 914
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California,
413 U.S.
15, 47 (1973), and because the judgment of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina was rendered after Miller, I would reverse. In that
circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other
questions presented plenary review. See Heller v. New York,
413 U.S.
483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, on the basis of the Court's own holding in Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974), its dismissal is improper. As permitted by Supreme
Court 21(1), which provides that the record in a case need not be
certified to this Court, the appellant did not certify the
allegedly obscene materials involved in this case. It is plain,
therefore, that the Court, which has not requested the
certification of those materials, has failed to discharge its
admitted responsibility under Jenkins independently to review those
materials under the second and third parts of the Miller obscenity
test. Nor can it be assumed that the court below performed such a
review, since that responsibility was not made clear until Jenkins.
Appellant has thus never been provided the independent judicial
review to which the Court held him entitled in Jenkins. At a
minimum, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for
such a review.
Finally, it does not appear from the jurisdictional statement
and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was
adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent
in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), I
believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, appellant
must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and
introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his
conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own
terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a
determination whether appellant
Page 418 U.S.
911 , 915
should be afforded a new trial under local community
standards.
Footnotes
[Footnote *] Although four of us
would grant and reverse, the Justices who join this opinion do not
insist the the case be decided on the merits.
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