Philadelphia & Trenton R. Co. v. Stimpson
39 U.S. 448 (1840)

Annotate this Case

U.S. Supreme Court

Philadelphia & Trenton R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 14 Pet. 448 448 (1840)

Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad Company v. Stimpson

39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Syllabus

Action for the violation of a patent right, granted to the patentee for "a new and useful improvement in turning short curves on railroads."

On 26 September, 1835, a second patent was granted, the original patent, granted in 1831, having been surrendered and cancelled on account of a defective specification, the second patent being for fourteen years from the date of the original patent. The second patent was in the precise form of the original, except the recital of the fact that the former patent was cancelled "on account of a defective specification" and the statement of the time the second patent was to begin to run. It was objected that the second patent should not be admitted in evidence on the trial of the case because it did not contain any recitals that the prerequisites of the act of Congress of 1836, authorizing the renewal of patents had been complied with. Held that this objection cannot in point of law be maintained. The patent was issued under the great seal of the United States and is signed by the President and countersigned by the

Secretary of State. It is a presumption of law that all public officers, and especially such high functionaries, perform their proper official duties until the contrary is proved. Where an act is to be done or patent granted upon evidence and proofs to be laid before a public officer upon which he is to decide, the fact that he has done the act in granting the patent is prima facie evidence that the proofs have been regularly made, and were

satisfactory. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of such proofs, when the law has made the officer the proper judge of their sufficiency and competency.

Patents for lands, equally with patents for inventions, have in courts of justice been deemed prima facie evidence that they have been regularly granted, whenever they have been produced under the great seal of the government, without any recitals or proofs that the prerequisites of the acts under which they have been issued have been duly observed. In cases of patents, the United States have gone one step further, and as the patentee is required to make oath that he is the true inventor before he can obtain a patent, the patent has been deemed prima facie evidence that he has made the invention.

It is incumbent on those who seek to show that the examination of a witness has been improperly rejected to establish their right to have the evidence admitted, for the court will be presumed to have acted correctly until the contrary is established.

To entitle a party to examine a witness in a patent cause the purpose of whose testimony is to disprove the right of the patentee to the invention by showing its use prior to the patent by others, the provisions of the patent act of 1836 relative to notice must be strictly complied with.

It is incumbent on those who insist upon the right to put particular questions to a witness to establish that right beyond any reasonable doubt for the very purpose stated by them, and they are not afterwards at liberty to desert that purpose and to show the pertinency or relevancy of the evidence for any other purpose not then suggested to the court.

A party has no right to cross-examine any witness except as to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in his direct examination. If he wishes to examine him on other matters, he must do so by making the witness his own and calling him as such in the subsequent progress of the cause. A party cannot, by his own omission to take an objection to the admission of improper evidence, brought out on a cross-examination, found a right to introduce testimony in chief to rebut it or explain it.

Parol evidence bearing upon written contracts and papers ought not to be admitted in evidence without the production of such written contracts or papers so as to enable both the court and the jury to see whether or not the admission of the parol evidence in any manner will trench upon the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict written contracts or papers.

As a general rule, and upon general principles, the declarations and conversations of the plaintiff are not admissible evidence in favor of his own rights. This is, however, but a general rule, and admits and requires various exceptions. There are many cases in which a party may show his declarations comport with acts in his own favor, as a part

Page 39 U. S. 449

of the res gestae. There are other cases in which his material declarations have been admitted.

In an action for an assault and battery and wounding, the declarations of the plaintiff to his internal pains, aches, injuries, and symptoms, to the physician attending him are admissible for the purpose of showing the nature and extent of the injuries done to him. In many cases of inventions, it is hardly possible in any other manner to ascertain the precise time and exact origin of the invention.

The conversations and declarations of a patentee merely affirming that at some former period he had invented a particular machine may well be objected to. But his conversations and declarations, stating that he had made an invention and describing its details and explaining its operations are properly deemed an assertion of his right, at that time, as an inventor, to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known, although not of their existence at an anterior time. Such declarations, coupled with a description of the nature and objects of the invention, are to be deemed a part of the res gestae, and legitimate evidence that the invention was then known and claimed by him, and thus its origin may be fixed at least as early as that period.

If the rejection of evidence is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court, this cannot be assigned as error.

The mode of conducting trials, the order of introducing evidence, and the times when it is to be introduced are properly matters belonging to the practice of the circuit courts, with which the Supreme Court ought not to interfere unless it shall chose to prescribe some fixed general rules on the subject, under the authority of the act of Congress. The circuit courts possess this discretion in as ample a manner as other judicial tribunals.

Testimony was not offered by a defendant or stated by him as matter of defense in the stage of the cause when it is usually introduced according to the practice of the court. It was offered after the defendant's counsel had stated in open court that they had closed their evidence, and after the plaintiff, in consequence of that declaration, had discharged his own witness. The circuit court refused to admit the testimony. Held that this decision was proper.

At the April session of the circuit court, James Stimpson instituted an action against the plaintiffs in error for the recovery of damages, for the violation of a patent granted to him by the United States on 26 September, 1835, for "a new and useful improvement in the mode of turning short curves on railroads."

The case was tried on 16 February, 1839, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for the sum of four thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. On 6 May, 1839, a remittitur was entered on the docket of the court for the sum of one thousand dollars and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff for three thousand two hundred and fifty dollars.

On the trial of the cause, the defendants tendered a bill of exceptions to the decision of the court on its admitting the patent to the plaintiff in evidence and to other rulings of the court in the course of the trial. The defendants prosecuted this writ of error.

The patent granted by the United States to James Stimpson was as follows:

"The United States of America; to all to whom these letters patent shall come."

"Whereas, James Stimpson, a citizen of the United States, hath alleged that he has invented a new and useful improvement in the

Page 39 U. S. 450

mode of turning short curves on railroads, for which letters patent were granted the twenty-third day of August, 1831, which letters being hereby cancelled on account of a defective specification, which improvement, he states, has not been known or used before his application, hath made oath that he does verily believe that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the said improvement, hath paid into the Treasury of the United States the sum of thirty dollars, delivered a receipt for the same, and presented a petition to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the said improvement, and praying that a patent may be granted for that purpose. These are therefore to grant according to law to the said James Stimpson, his heirs, administrators, or assigns, for the term of fourteen years from the twenty-third day of August, 1831, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said improvement, a description whereof is given in the words of the said James Stimpson himself in the schedule hereto annexed."

"Tested at Washington under the seal of the United States on 26 September, 1836, by the President of the United States and certified in the usual form by the Attorney General of the United States."

"The schedule referred to in these letters patent, and making a part of the same," contained

"a description in the words of the said James Stimpson himself of his improvement in the mode of turning short curves on railroads, for which letters patent were granted, dated 23 August, 1831, which letters patent being hereby cancelled on account of a defective specification."

The specification describes the invention with minute particularity, and concludes:

"What I claim as my invention or improvement is the application of the flanges of the wheels on one side of railroad carriages, and of the treads of the wheels on the other side, to turn curves upon railways, particularly such as turning the corners of the streets, wharves, &c., in cities and elsewhere, operating upon the principle herein set forth."

The bill of exceptions stated that the counsel for the plaintiff offered in evidence the patent and specification, to the admission of which in evidence the counsel for the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled by the court, and the evidence was admitted.

2. The defendants offered to give in evidence, by Josiah White, the description of a flange upon one side of the railroad cars, and the running upon the tread of the wheel upon the other side, with the flange in a groove, for the turning of curves, which he had seen in use before the date of plaintiff's patent, which was objected to by the counsel for the plaintiff, and the objection sustained by the court. The objection of the counsel for the plaintiff to the introduction of the testimony of Josiah White, was founded on the absence

Page 39 U. S. 451

of the notice required by the Act of Congress of the use of the machine at Mauch Chunk, at which place, it was said, his testimony would show it had been used.

3. The third exception was to the refusal of the court to allow the defendants to introduce proof of the conversations between the patentee and the counsel of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, while an arrangement of a suit against the Company was made, as to the character and effects of the arrangements.

4. The counsel for the plaintiff, by rebutting evidence, to extend his claim to the invention prior to the time at which the defendants had proved the reduction of the same into use and practice by others, offered to give evidence by witnesses of the conversations of the patentee on the subject of his invention at an anterior period; which conversations were intended to show the making of the invention by the patentee, before and at the period when the same took place. The counsel for the defendants objected to the admission of this testimony, but the court overruled the objection.

5. The fifth exception was to the refusal of the court to admit the examination of Dr. Thomas P. Jones. The plaintiff had discharged his witnesses on the declaration of the defendants' counsel that they had closed their evidence. The testimony asked from Dr. Jones was to new facts. The court refused to admit the testimony, on the ground that the testimony was improper, and that it was offered too late.

Page 39 U. S. 457

MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, rendered in an action brought by Stimpson, the defendant in error, against the plaintiffs in error for a violation of a patent right granted to him for a new and useful improvement in the mode of turning short curves on railroads.

A patent was originally granted to Stimpson for the same invention on 23 August, 1831, and the renewed patent, upon which

Page 39 U. S. 458

the present suit is brought, was granted on 26 September, 1835, upon the former letters patent "being cancelled on account of a defective specification," and the renewed patent was for the term of fourteen years from the date of the original patent. With the exception of the recital of the fact that the former letters patent were cancelled "on account of a defective specification," and the statement of the prior date from which the renewed patent was be begin to run, the renewed patent is in the precise form in which original patents are granted.

At the trial upon the general issue, a bill of exceptions was taken to certain rulings of the court upon points of evidence, to the consideration of which we shall at once proceed without any further preface.

The first exception taken is to the admission of the renewed patent as evidence in the cause to the jury. The Patent Act of 1832, ch. 162, sec. 3, under which this patent was obtained, provides that whenever any patent shall be inoperative or invalid by reason that any of the terms or conditions prescribed by the prior acts of Congress, have not, by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, been complied with on the part of the inventor, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State, upon the surrender to him of such patent, to cause a new patent to be granted to the inventor for the same invention for the residue of the period then unexpired for which the original patent was granted, upon his compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the third section of the Act of 21 February, 1793, ch. 55.

Now the objection is that the present patent does not contain any recitals that the prerequisites thus stated in the act have been complied with, viz., that the error in the former patent has arisen by inadvertency, accident, or mistake and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, and that without such recitals, as it is the case of a special authority, the patent is a mere nullity and inoperative. We are of opinion that the objection cannot in point of law be maintained. The patent was issued under the great seal of the United States, and is signed by the President and countersigned by the Secretary of State. It is a presumption of law that all public officers, and especially such high functionaries, perform their proper official duties until the contrary is proved. And where, as in the present case, an act is to be done or patent granted upon evidence and proofs to be laid before a public officer, upon which he is to decide, the fact that he has done the act or granted the patent is prima facie evidence that the proofs have been regularly made and were satisfactory. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of such proofs if laid before him when the law has made such officer the proper judge of their sufficiency and competency. It is not, then, necessary for the patent to contain any recitals that the prerequisites to the grant of it have been duly complied with, for the law makes the presumption, and if, indeed, it were otherwise, the recitals would not help the case without the

Page 39 U. S. 459

auxiliary proof that these prerequisites had been de facto complied with. This has been the uniform construction, as far as we know, in all our courts of justice upon matters of this sort. Patents for lands, equally with patents for inventions, have been deemed prima facie evidence that they were regularly granted whenever they have been produced under the great seal of the government, without any recitals or proofs that the prerequisites of the acts under which they have been issued have been duly observed. In cases of patents, the courts of the United States have gone one step further, and as the patentee is required to make oath that he is the true inventor before he can obtain a patent, the patent has been deemed prima facie evidence that he has made the invention. This objection, then, is overruled, and there was no error in the circuit court in the admission of the patent.

The next exception is to the refusal of the court to allow a witness, Josiah White, to give a description of an invention which he had seen on the Mauch Chunk railroad in 1827 which had a groove on one side, and run on the other on a flange for crossing, for the purpose of showing that the supposed invention of the plaintiff was known and in use by others, before the date of his patent. By the patent act of 1836 (which was applicable to the present point), it is provided in the fifteenth section that whenever the defendant relies in his defense on the fact of a previous invention, knowledge, or use of the thing patented, he shall state in his notice of special matter to be used in his defense the names and places of residence of those, whom he intends to prove to have possessed a prior knowledge of the thing, and where the same had been used. The object of this most salutary provision is to prevent patentees' being surprised at the trial of the cause by evidence of a nature which they could not be presumed to know or be prepared to meet, and thereby to subject them either to most expensive delays or to a loss of their cause. It is incumbent on those who seek to show that the examination of a witness has been improperly rejected, to establish their right to have the evidence admitted, for the court will be presumed to have acted correctly until the contrary is established.

In the present case, there is no proof on the record that notice had been given according to the requirements of the statute that White was to be a witness for the purpose above stated. Unless such notice was given, it is plain that the examination could not be rightfully had. The onus probandi is on the defendants to show it, and unless they produce the notice, the objection must fail. In point of fact it was admitted by counsel at the argument that no such notice was given. In either view, then, from the admission or from the defect of the preliminary proof of notice in the record, the exception is not maintainable.

The next exception is to the refusal of the court to allow certain questions to be put by the defendants to John H. B. Latrobe, a witness introduced by the defendants to maintain the issue on their part. Latrobe, on his examination, stated

"I know Mr. Stimpson

Page 39 U. S. 460

by sight and character. He granted to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company the privilege of using the curved ways on their railroad, and all lateral roads connected therewith. I fix the date of the contract in the early part of October, 1834, because I have then a receipt of Mr. Stimpson's counsel for two thousand five hundred dollars. Mr. Stimpson laid his claim against the Baltimore Company for an infringement of his patent in 1832. It was referred to me by the Company, and I advised them."

The counsel for the defendants then offered to prove by the same witness the declarations of the plaintiff and his agent to the witness that the settlement made with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company with the plaintiff was not an admission by the said company of the plaintiff's right in the alleged invention, but a mere compromise of a pending suit, disconnected with a grant, in writing, made by the plaintiff to the said company, and to that end proposed to put the following questions, respectively, and in order, to the witness:

"1. Do you know who was the agent or attorney of James Stimpson, in negotiating the arrangement and settlement between him and the company referred to? Who was he?"

"2. State if any conversations occurred between James Stimpson or his agent or counsel at any time during the negotiations regarding the rights claimed by him in the patent for curved ways, without reference to the existence of a written contract, or its contents."

"3. What were they?"

The court refused to allow these questions to be put, for the purpose aforesaid.

Now (as has been already intimated) it is incumbent upon those who insist upon the right to put particular questions to a witness to establish that right beyond any reasonable doubt for the very purpose stated by them, and they are not afterwards at liberty to desert that purpose and to show the pertinency or relevancy of the evidence for any other purpose not then suggested to the court. It was not pretended at the argument that the evidence so offered was good evidence in chief in behalf of the defendants upon the issue in the cause. It was res inter alios acta, and had no tendency to disprove the defendant's title to the invention or to support any title set up by the defendants, for no privity was shown between the defendants and the Baltimore Company. As evidence in chief, therefore, it was irrelevant and inadmissible. The sole purpose for which it was offered, so far as it was then declared to the court, was to show that the compromise with the Baltimore Company was not founded on any admission of the plaintiff's right in the invention. Be it so; it was then inconsequential, for it certainly had no just tendency to disprove his right. If the compromise had been offered on the part of the plaintiff for the purpose of establishing his right to the invention, there is no pretense to say that it would have been admissible against the defendants. In the converse case, it is equally inadmissible for the defendants.

But it is now said that the evidence was in fact offered for the purpose of rebutting or explaining certain statements made by one

Page 39 U. S. 461

Ross Winans, a witness called by the defendants, in his answers upon his cross-examination by the plaintiff's counsel. Now this purpose is not necessarily, or even naturally, suggested by the purpose avowed in the record. Upon his cross-examination, Winans stated: "I understood there were arrangements made with the Baltimore Company. I heard the Company paid five thousand dollars." Now certainly these statements, if objected to by the defendants, would have been inadmissible upon two distinct grounds. 1. First, as mere hearsay; 2. and secondly upon the broader principle, now well established, although sometimes lost sight of in our loose practice at trials, that a party has no right to cross-examine any witness except as to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in his direct examination. If he wishes to examine him to other matters, he must do so by making the witness his own, and calling him, as such, in the subsequent progress of the cause. The question then is presented whether a party can, by his own omission to take an objection to the admission of improper evidence brought out on a cross-examination, found a right to introduce testimony in chief to rebut it or explain it. If upon the cross-examination, Winans' answer had been such as was unfavorable to the plaintiff, upon the collateral matters thus asked, which were not founded in the issue, he would have been bound by it, and not permitted to introduce evidence to contradict it.

There is great difficulty in saying that the defendants ought to be in a more favored predicament, and to acquire rights founded upon the like evidence to which they did not choose to make any objection, although otherwise it could not have been in the cause. But waiving this consideration, the grounds on which we think the refusal of the court was right are first, that it was not distinctly propounded to the court that the evidence was offered to rebut or explain Winans' testimony, and secondly that in the form in which it was put, it proposed to separate the written contract of compromise from the conversations and negotiations which led to it, and to introduce the latter without the former, although it might turn out that the written paper might most materially affect or control the presumptions deducible from those conversations, and negotiations. We think that upon the settled principles of law, parol evidence bearing upon written contracts and papers ought not to be admitted without the production of such written contracts or papers so as to enable both the court and the jury to see whether or not the admission of the parol evidence in any manner will trench upon the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict written contracts or papers.

The next exception is to the admission of the evidence of William A. Stimpson, Richard Caton, and George Neilson, as to certain declarations and statements and conversations of the plaintiff as to his invention prior to the date of his original patent in order to rebut the evidence of the defendants as to the invention or use by other persons of the same contrivance before that date. The objection

Page 39 U. S. 462

is that, upon general principles, the declarations and conversations of a plaintiff are not admissible evidence in favor of his own rights. As a general rule, this is undoubtedly true. It is, however, but a general rule, and admits and requires various exceptions. There are many cases in which a party may show his declarations conflict with acts in his own favor as a part of the res gestae. There are other cases, again, in which his material declarations have been admitted. Thus, for example, in the case of an action for an assault and battery and wounding, it has been held that the declarations of the plaintiff as to his internal pains, aches, injuries, and symptoms to the physician called to prescribe for him are admissible for the purpose of showing the nature and extent of the injuries done to him. See 1 Phillips on Evidence ch. 12, sec. 1, 200-202, eighth ed., 1838. In many cases of inventions it is hardly possible in any other manner to ascertain the precise time and exact origin of the particular invention. The invention itself is an intellectual process or operation, and, like all other expressions of thought, can in many cases scarcely be made known except by speech. The invention may be consummated and perfect, and may be susceptible of complete description in words a month or even a year before it can be embodied in any visible form, machine, or composition of matter. It might take a year to construct a steamboat after the inventor had completely mastered all the details of his invention and had fully explained them to all the various artisans whom he might employ to construct the different parts of the machinery. And yet from those very details and explanations another ingenious mechanic might be able to construct the whole apparatus and assume to himself the priority of the invention. The conversations and declarations of a patentee merely affirming that at some former period he invented that particular machine might well be objected to. But his conversations and declarations stating that he had made an invention and describing its details and explaining its operations are properly to be deemed an assertion of his right, at that time, as an inventor to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known, although not of their existence at an antecedent time. In short, such conversations and declarations, coupled with a description of the nature and objects of the invention, are to be deemed a part of the res gestae, and legitimate evidence that the invention was then known to and claimed by him, and thus its origin may be fixed at least as early as that period. This view of the subject covers all the parts of the testimony of the witnesses objected to in the circuit court, and we are of opinion that the court were right in admitting the evidence.

The next and last exception is to the rejection of the evidence of Dr. Jones, who was offered to prove that there were material differences between the patent of 1831 and the renewed patent of 1835, and to explain these differences. No doubt can be entertained that the testimony thus offered was or might be most material to

Page 39 U. S. 463

the merits of the defense. And the question is not as to the competency or relevancy of the evidence, but as to the propriety of its being admitted at the time when it was offered. It appears that the testimony was not offered by the defendants, or stated by them as a matter of defense, in the stage of the cause when it is usually introduced according to the practice of the court. It was offered after the defendants' counsel had stated in open court that they had closed their evidence, and after the plaintiff, in consequence of that declaration, had discharged his own witnesses. The question, then, is whether it was at that time admissible on the part of the defendants as a matter of right, or whether its admission was a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court. If the latter, then it is manifest that the rejection of it cannot be assigned as error.

The mode of conducting trials, the order of introducing evidence, and the times when it is to be introduced are, properly matters belonging to the practice of the circuit courts, with which this Court ought not to interfere unless it shall choose to prescribe some fixed, general rules on the subject, under the authority of the act of Congress. Probably the practice in no two states of the Union is exactly the same, and therefore, in each state, the circuit courts must necessarily be vested with a large discretion in the regulation of their practice. If every party had a right to introduce evidence at any time, at his own election, without reference to the stage of the trial in which it is offered, it is obvious that the proceedings of the court would often be greatly embarrassed, the purposes of justice be obstructed, and the parties themselves be surprised by evidence destructive of their rights, which they could not have foreseen or in any manner have guarded against. It seems to us, therefore, that all courts ought to be, as indeed they generally are, invested with a large discretion on this subject to prevent the most mischievous consequences in the administration of justice to suitors, and we think that the circuit courts possess this discretion in as ample a manner as other judicial tribunals. We do not feel at liberty, therefore, to interfere with the exercise of this discretion, and indeed if we were called upon to say upon the present record whether this discretion was in fact misapplied or not, we should be prepared to say that we see no reason to doubt that it was, under all the circumstances, wisely and properly exercised. It is sufficient for us, however, that it was a matter of discretion and practice in respect to which we possess no authority to revise the decision of the circuit court.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought to be

Affirmed with costs.

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