FTC v. Jantzen, Inc.Annotate this Case
386 U.S. 228 (1967)
U.S. Supreme Court
FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 386 U.S. 228 (1967)
Federal Trade Commission v. Jantzen, Inc.
Argued February 14, 1967
Decided March 13, 1967
386 U.S. 228
Respondent, a manufacturer, in 1958 consented to the entry of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cease and desist order prohibiting it from engaging in further discriminatory activities violating § 2(d) of the Clayton Act, and the FTC adopted the order in 1959. In 1964, following charges of additional discriminatory activities, respondent stipulated that it had committed violations of the 1959 order. The FTC petitioned the Court of Appeals to enforce the original order under the third paragraph of § 11 of the original Clayton Act, which authorized the FTC to apply to a court of appeals for enforcement of its orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, upholding respondent's contention that a 1959 amendment (the Finality Act) substituting new enforcement remedies for those in § 11 had repealed the authority of the FTC to seek, and of the courts to grant, enforcement of FTC cease and desist orders entered before the Finality Act took effect.
Held: FTC orders under the Clayton Act entered before the Finality Act was enacted remain enforceable under § 11 of the Clayton Act. Pp. 386 U. S. 233-236.
(a) The provision in § 2 of the Finality Act making the Act's provisions inapplicable to a Clayton Act "proceeding initiated" before enactment of the Finality Act refers to the filing of the "proceeding" before the FTC, and is not limited to the application for enforcement or petition for review in a court of appeals. P. 386 U. S. 233.
(b) The express purpose of the Finality Act "to provide for the more expeditious enforcement of cease and desist orders" and the Act's legislative history are inconsistent with giving absolution to the almost 400 proven violators of the Clayton Act who are subject to pre-Finality Act orders of the FTC. P. 386 U. S. 234.
356 F.2d 253, reversed and remanded.