Electrical Workers v. Labor BoardAnnotate this Case
366 U.S. 667 (1961)
U.S. Supreme Court
Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.S. 667 (1961)
Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board
Argued April 17-18, 1961
Decided May 29, 1961
366 U.S. 667
In this case arising under § 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, a manufacturer operated a plant in a large area to which a drainage ditch made ingress and egress impossible except over five roadways across culverts, which were called gates. Four of these gates were used by its own employees; but they were forbidden to use the fifth, which was reserved for the exclusive use of employees of independent contractors, some of whom did construction work on new buildings, some installed and repaired ventilating and heating equipment, some engaged in retooling and rearranging operations necessary for the manufacture of new models, and others did "general maintenance work." Petitioner union, which represented most of the manufacturer's employees at the plant, called a strike and picketed all gates, including that reserved for the exclusive use of employees of independent contractors. The National Labor Relations Board held that the picketing at that gate was intended to enmesh those employees of neutral employers in a dispute with the manufacturer, and that it violated § 8(b)(4)(A). The Court of Appeals sustained this finding and granted enforcement of the Board's order.
Held: the Board's order should be sustained unless the gate in question was in fact used to a substantial extent by employees of independent contractors who performed conventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of the manufacturer. Since the record shows some such mingled use, but shed no light on its extent, the judgment is reversed with directions that the case be remanded to the Board for determination of the extent of such mingled use. Pp. 366 U. S. 668-682.
107 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 278 F. 2d 282, reversed and remanded.