Pullman Co. v. Jenkins - 305 U.S. 534 (1939)
U.S. Supreme Court
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939)
Pullman Company v. Jenkins
Argued December 13, 14, 1938
Decided January 16, 1939
305 U.S. 534
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
1. Existence of a separable controversy for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 71 is determined according to the plaintiff's pleading at the time of petition for removal. P. 305 U. S. 537.
2. If, as to the nonresident defendant seeking removal, the controversy is separable within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 71, the fact that, under the state practice, it may be joined in the same suit with another controversy as against other defendants does not preclude removal. P. 305 U. S. 538.
3. Where, in the absence of clear proof of bad faith in the joinder, concurrent acts of negligence on the part of the defendants sued as joint tortfeasors are sufficiently alleged, a separable controversy is not presented, and the fact that the defendants might have been sued separately affords no ground for removal. This rule is applied where a nonresident employer and its resident employee, whose negligence caused the injury, are sued jointly. P. 305 U. S. 538.
4. A nonresident sleeping car company and its resident porter were sued for negligence, committed by the action of the porter, in permitting a drunken and disorderly man to board a sleeping car, who, whilst being ejected, struck the plaintiff's husband, the train conductor, causing his death.
(1) That this controversy was separable from others in the same complaint, viz., a claim against the assailant for the assault, and a claim against the railway company and its gatetender for negligence in permitting the assailant to enter the station and go through the gates, without showing his ticket, to board the train. P. 305 U. S. 539.
(2) The nonresident car company, being charged jointly with its resident employee, could not remove the case to the federal court. P. 305 U. S. 540.
(3) The facts that the porter was sued by a fictitious name and his residence not alleged in the complaint did not justify removal. Id.
It was incumbent upon the car company to show that it had a separable controversy which was wholly between citizens of different States. As, in determining whether there was such a separable
controversy with respect to the car company, its porter could not be ignored, the car company was bound to show that he was a nonresident in order to justify removal.
5. Where there is nonseparable controversy against a nonresident and a resident defendant, the fact that the resident has not been served with process does not justify removal by the nonresident. P. 305 U. S. 540.
6. It is always open to the nonresident defendant to show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good faith, and for that reason should not be considered in determining the right to remove. P. 305 U. S. 541.
96 F.2d 405 affirmed as to result.
Certiorari, post, p. 583, to review the reversal of a judgment of the District Court, 17 F.Supp. 820, dismissing, upon the ground of settlement and release, an action in tort which had been removed from a state court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether petitioner, the Pullman Company, was entitled to remove this cause to the federal court. The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, ordered remand (9 Cir., 96 F.2d 405) and, because of conflict in the ground of its ruling with decisions of this Court, we granted certiorari.
Respondent, Mrs. Jenkins, and her son Robert W. Jenkins, by Mrs. Jenkins as guardian ad litem, brought this action on September 27, 1935, in the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, California, to recover damages for injuries causing the death of her husband. He was
employed by the Southern Pacific Company as conductor of a train running from Los Angeles to San Francisco. His injuries were due to a blow struck by A. J. Kash, who was being removed from the train by police officers called to assist the conductor in ejecting Kash because of his disorderly conduct. The suit was brought against the Southern Pacific Company, the Pullman Company, Kash, Hatch, the Pullman conductor, John Doe One, described as employed by the Pullman Company as porter, and John Doe Two, described as employed by the Southern Pacific Company as gatetender at the passenger depot as Los Angeles.
The complaint alleged two causes of action -- one against all the defendants, the other against Kash alone. The plaintiffs and defendant Kash were stated to be residents of California. The Southern Pacific Company was described as a Kentucky corporation, and the Pullman Company as an Illinois corporation. The residences of the defendants Hatch and John Doe One and John Doe Two were not set forth.
On November 20, 1935, the Pullman Company, as a citizen and resident of Illinois, insisting that the controversy as to it was a separable one, filed its petition for removal to the federal court, with bond, and on November 25, 1935, the petition and bond were approved and removal was ordered. On the day on which that order was entered, an amended complaint was filed in the state court which contained the allegation that the action was brought against the Southern Pacific Company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 45 U.S.C. § 51. On December 27, 1935, Mrs. Jenkins, as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, was substituted as plaintiff. On January 17, 1936, the defendant Hatch demurred to the amended complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action against him, and on January 29, 1936, the demurrer was sustained.
On January 22, 1936, the plaintiffs moved to remand, stating that Edward E. Meyers, the Pullman porter, sued as John Doe One, had been served with process on January 14, 1936, and that he and the defendant Hatch were residents and citizens of California, and that the action as against them and the Pullman Company was not a separable controversy. Pending this motion, on February 8, 1936, the plaintiffs filed in the federal court a second amended complaint identifying Meyers as the Pullman porter and Fred M. Dolsen as John Doe Two, described as the Southern Pacific gatetender. This amended complaint repeated the allegation that the Southern Pacific was sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. On February 19, 1936, the court denied the motion to remand.
On December 28, 1936, the action was dismissed as against the Southern Pacific and Dolsen as the result of a compromise. Supplemental answers were then filed by the remaining defendants, respectively, claiming release by reason of the agreement with the Southern Pacific. The District Court sustained this defense and entered judgment dismissing the complaint.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals, passing the other questions, held that, if it did not sufficiently appear at the time of the petition for removal that the cause was not separable, it did so appear when the second amended complaint was filed, and hence that the District Court erred in denying the motion to remand. 96 F.2d p. 410. This ruling was placed upon an erroneous ground. The second amended complaint should not have been considered in determining the right to remove, which, in a case like the present one, was to be determined according to the plaintiffs' pleading at the time of the petition for removal. Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 103 U. S. 213-216; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571, 132 U. S. 585; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 132 U. S. 601;
The question, then, is whether the original complaint set forth a separable controversy between the plaintiffs and the Pullman Company -- that is, a controversy "which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them." 28 U.S.C. § 71. If, as to the nonresident defendant seeking removal, the controversy is separable within the purview of the statute as construed, the fact that, under the state practice, it may be joined in the same suit with another controversy as against other defendants does not preclude removal. Barney v. Latham, supra; Nichols v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 195 F. 913, 915, 916; Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 F.2d 309, 311; Des Moines Elevator & Grain Co. v. Underwriters' Grain Assn., 63 F.2d 103, 105; Culp v. Baldwin, 87 F.2d 679, 680-682.
This is so whether the action sounds in contract or in tort. The question is determined by the plaintiff's pleading. Thus, if defendants are charged with negligence, but the charge against the nonresident defendant is based on different and nonconcurrent acts of negligence and a cause of action which is joint in character is not alleged, a separable controversy is presented. See Culp v. Baldwin, supra. Where, in the absence of clear proof of bad faith in the joinder, concurrent acts of negligence on the part of the defendants sued as joint tortfeasors are sufficiently alleged, a separable controversy is not presented, and the fact that the defendants might have been sued separately affords no ground for removal. This rule is applied where a nonresident employer and its resident employee, whose negligence caused the injury, are sued jointly. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 179 U. S. 139; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S.
206, 212-213, 200 U. S. 220; Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U. S. 102, 229 U. S. 111-113; Hay v. May Department Stores Co., 271 U. S. 318, 271 U. S. 321-322; Watson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 68 F.2d 686, 689; Harrelson v. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co., 87 F.2d 176, 177.
In the instant case, the original complaint did not charge any negligence or wrongful conduct in ejecting Kash from the train. On the contrary, it was alleged that he was intoxicated, and was acting in an offensive, threatening, and quarrelsome manner in which he persisted despite remonstrance. There was clearly a separable controversy with respect to Kash. He was sued for his unlawful assault upon the conductor.
The negligence charged against the Southern Pacific Company and its gatetender was in the action of the latter in permitting Kash to enter the station and go through the gates to board the train without displaying his ticket and while drunk and disorderly. The negligence charged against the Pullman Company and its porter was alleged to consist in the action of the porter in permitting Kash to board the Pullman sleeper. No facts were alleged upon which liability of the Pullman Company and its employees could be predicated upon the negligence of the Southern Pacific Company and its gatetender. It was not shown that either the Pullman Company or the Southern Pacific Company was liable for the acts of the other or that they joined in the commission of any wrong. With respect to these companies in relation to each other, the cases above cited, so far as they hold that a separable controversy is not presented when master and servant are joined because of concurrent negligence, are not in point.
Nor was any negligence or wrongful act alleged on the part of the Pullman conductor.
The question, however, remains as to the effect of the joinder of the Pullman porter. If the porter had been
sued in his proper name, instead of John Doe, had been described as a citizen of California, and had been served with process prior to the petition for removal, there could be no question that the Pullman Company would not have been entitled to remove. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Dixon, supra; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, supra; Hay v. May Department Stores Company, supra.
We think that the fact that the Pullman porter was sued by a fictitious name did not justify removal. His relation to the Pullman Company and his negligence as its servant were fully alleged. See Grosso v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 217 F. 422. Nor does the fact that the residence of the porter was not set forth justify disregarding him. It was incumbent upon the Pullman Company to show that it had a separable controversy which was wholly between citizens of different States. As, in determining whether there was such a separable controversy with respect to the Pullman Company, its porter could not be ignored, the Company was bound to show that he was a nonresident in order to justify removal.
At the time of the petition for removal, the Pullman porter had not yet been served with process. Where there is a nonseparable controversy with respect to several nonresident defendants, one of them may remove the cause although the other defendants have not been served with process and have not appeared. Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 F. 413, 416; Bowles v. H. J. Heinz Co., 188 F. 937; Hunt v. Pearce, 271 F. 498; 284 F. 321, 323, 324; Community Building Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F.2d 678; Trower v. Stonebraker-Zea Co., 17 F.Supp. 687, 690; Kelly v. Alabama Quenelda Graphite Co., 34 F.2d 790, 791. In such a case, there is diversity of citizenship, and the reason for the rule is stated to be that the defendant not served may never be served, or may be served after the time has expired for the defendant who has been served to apply for a removal, and unless
the latter can make an effective application alone, his right to removal may be lost. Hunt v. Pearce, 284 F. page 324. But the rule is otherwise where a nonseparable controversy involves a resident defendant. In that case, the fact that the resident defendant has not been served with process does not justify removal by the nonresident defendant. Patchin v. Hunter, 38 F. 51, 53; Armstrong v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 192 F. 608, 615; Hunt v. Pearce, 271 F. p. 502; Del Fungo Giera v. Rockland Light & Power Co., 46 F.2d 552, 554; Hane v. Mid-Continent Corp., 47 F.2d 244, 246, 247. It may be said that the nonresident defendant may be prejudiced because his codefendant may not be served. On the other hand, there is no diversity of citizenship, and, the controversy being a nonseparable one, the nonresident defendant should not be permitted to seize an opportunity to remove the cause before service upon the resident codefendant is effected. It is always open to the nonresident defendant to show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good faith, and, for that reason, should not be considered in determining the right to remove. Wecker v. National Enameling Co., 204 U. S. 176, 204 U. S. 185-186; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U. S. 146, 232 U. S. 152; Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U. S. 92, 257 U. S. 97; Clancy v. Brown, 71 F.2d 110, 112, 113.
In the instant case, there was no charge that the joinder was fraudulent. On the motion to remand, it appeared that the Pullman porter, identified as Meyers, was a resident of California, and had then been served with process.
We conclude that the District Court erred in denying the motion to remand, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
I agree that it was incumbent upon the Pullman Company, seeking removal, to show that it was sued in a controversy "wholly between citizens of different States;" [Footnote 1] that the Company failed to meet this burden; that plaintiff's joining the Pullman Company with a Pullman porter designated by a fictitious name did not relieve the Company of its statutory burden; that, consequently, the District Court erred in denying a motion to remand, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court's refusal to remand, should be affirmed. To certain portions of the opinion, which this affirmance does not require, I cannot agree.
First. The original complaint filed in the State court indicated plaintiff's intention to rest its case against the Southern Pacific Company upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, under which suits brought in State courts are not removable to Federal courts. [Footnote 2] The pleadings did not disclose that the suit was based on the Federal Act as clearly as good pleading requires, and the complaint was doubtless subject to special demurrer because of its generality. But the mere fact that a complaint based on the Federal Act is demurrable does not make it subject to removal. In addition, both an amendment filed in the State court before the order of removal (but after the petition for removal), and a second amendment filed after removal, served to make the original complaint more precise and made clear the original purpose of claiming under the Federal Employers' Liability Act without changing the original cause of action.
"It is true that the declaration was amended after the petition to remove . . but the amendment, if not unnecessary, merely made the original cause of action more precise. On the question of
removal, we have not to consider more than whether there was a real intention to get a joint judgment, and whether there was a colorable ground for it shown as the record stood when the [petition for removal was ruled on]. . . . We are not to decide whether a flaw could be picked in the declaration on special demurrer. [Footnote 3]"
Both from the original complaint and from its amendments, it seems clear to me that plaintiff sought relief under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and that the ruling of the Court of Appeals on that ground was proper.
Second. The disposition of this case on the ground set out in the opinion does not require the statement that,
"If, as to the nonresident defendant seeking removal, the controversy is separable within the purview of the statute as construed, the fact that, under the state practice, it may be joined in the same suit with another controversy as against other defendants does not preclude removal."
Nor do I agree that this is a correct construction of the removal statute. The statement is rested on the case of Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, and opinions from two Circuit Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 4] However, this Court later refused to accept the Latham case as authority for the proposition that the statutory right of removal "takes no account of . . . what may be the rules of practice, whether common law or statutory, of the State in which the action may be pending;" instead, it held exactly the opposite. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206 (see argument of counsel, p. 209 (consult printed version of U.S. Reports)). And, in Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221, 200 U. S. 225-226
(considered and decided with the Thompson case), the Court stated:
"While the case did not show an attempt to remove, the discussion of the subject by the Chief Justice strongly intimates that, if the action was properly joint in the form in which it was being prosecuted, it could not be removed as a separable controversy under the act of Congress. We have under consideration an action for tort which, by the Constitution and laws of the State, as interpreted by the highest court in the state, gives a joint remedy against master and servant to recover for negligent injuries. This Court has repeatedly held that a separable controversy must be shown upon the face of the petition or declaration, and that the defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several which the plaintiff elects to make joint. (See cases cited in Alabama Great Southern Railway Co. v. Thompson, supra). A state has an unquestionable right by its constitution and laws to regulate actions for negligence, and where it has provided that the plaintiff in such cases may proceed jointly or severally against those liable for the injury, and the plaintiff, in due course of law and in good faith, has filed a petition electing to sue for a joint recovery given by the laws of the state, we know of nothing in the Federal removal statute which will convert such action into a separable controversy for the purpose of removal, because of the presence of a nonresident defendant therein, properly joined in the action under the Constitution and laws of the state wherein it is conducting its operations, and is duly served with process."
It was thus broadly held that there can be no other or separable controversy if a plaintiff properly elects under State practice to sue defendants jointly. Even a separate defense, which may defeat a joint recovery, cannot
create a separable controversy when the plaintiff has a right to make his cause of action joint. [Footnote 5]
In cases which have involved the right of removal since the Latham case, this Court has repeatedly held that the
"joint liability of the defendants (one of whom is a nonresident) under the declaration, as amended, is a matter of state law, and upon that we shall not attempt to go behind the decision of the highest court of the state before which the question could come. [Footnote 6]"
Only two Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that causes of action properly joined under State practice may nevertheless be separable for purposes of removal; other Circuits have followed the decisions of this Court. [Footnote 7] cases from the two Circuits are relied upon to support the
language in the opinion of the Court to which I cannot agree. [Footnote 8] However, the cases relied upon from one of these two Circuits no longer appear to represent the rule even in that Circuit. [Footnote 9] And the lone case in the other of the two Circuits was contrary to and decided before the most recent decisions of this Court on the subject. [Footnote 10]
Third. It is, of course, true that, where governing State law characterizes actionable negligence of a local and a nonresident defendant as "concurrent negligence," there can be no right of removal. However, this is but one application of the rule governing removals under which we look to State law to determine the propriety of joining two or more defendants in a single suit. [Footnote 11] The opinion in the Thompson case, supra, was expressly designed to resolve the
"conflict in the authorities as to whether a corporation whose liability does not arise from an act of concurrence or direction on its part, but solely as a result of the relation of master and servant, may be jointly
sued with the servant whose negligent conduct directly caused the injury."
(At pp. 213-214). The question submitted for decision in that case was (pp. 212-213): "May a railroad corporation be jointly sued with two of its servants . . . though . . . not charged with any concurrent act of negligence?" This Court gave an affirmative answer.
The principle has been well stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit:
"Appellees contend that removal is prevented only where a master and servant are charged with concurrent negligence. The rule is settled otherwise. In Alabama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, supra, and Cincinnati, N.O. & Texas Pac. Ry. v. Bohan, supra, the master was alleged to be liable on the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is immaterial that the liability of the master and that of the servant proceed on different grounds; even more distinct were the bases of liability of the lessee and lessor railroad companies in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Willard, . . . [220 U.S. 413], where the lessor was held on its obligation to the public of which it could not be relieved by virtue of a lease. . . . Nothing in Hay v. May Department Stores Co., 271 U. S. 318, supports the claim that the rule of nonremovability is limited to instances of concurrent negligence. [Footnote 12]"
The Constitution authorizes Congress to fix the jurisdiction of Federal District Courts. The constitutional division of powers between the States and the National government makes it necessary that the jurisdictional policy declared by Congress be scrupulously observed. This is especially so in view of the fact that, after removal of a cause from a State court by reason of diversity of citizenship, the Federal court must proceed under State law and practice. Questions of state constitutional,
statutory and general law which have not been clearly and finally determined by the State's highest court may arise in the Federal court. The State court need not thereafter, in other litigation, follow the Federal court's decision on such questions. However, cases for which Congress has not authorized removal from a State court can be appealed to the State's highest judicial tribunal, thus giving each litigant a final determination of his rights under State laws by the body vested with final authority to interpret those laws. Rights and privileges under the Federal Constitution and laws, which may be involved in such litigation in a State court, can still be protected by appeal to this Court.
The statutory privilege of removal should be protected. But I do not believe that judicial construction should expand the statutory privilege beyond limits intended by the statute and properly recognized by this Court in previous decisions. Particularly, I think it unwise to indicate this step in a case in which decision and judgment do not require discussion of the question.
C. 3, § 71, 28 U.S.C..
C. 2, § 51, § 56, 45 U.S.C..
Nichols v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.; Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 F.2d 309; Des Moines Elevator & Grain Co. v. Underwriters' Grain Assn., 63 F.2d 103; Culp v. Baldwin, 87 F.2d 679 (but see pp. 679-680).
"The supreme court of the state decided that the petition stated a cause of action against Drake and the railway company, and whether it did, we said in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S. 184, was a matter of state law."
In Norwalk v. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp., 87 F.2d 317, 319, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "whether a separable controversy exists for the purpose of removal is determined by the state law," citing the Bohon case and the McWhirt case, supra. To the same effect are Johnson v. Noble, 64 F.2d 396, 398, Padgett v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 54 F.2d 576, 577, and Centerville State Bank v. Nat'l Surety Co., 37 F.2d 338; Gulf Refining Co. v. Morgan, 61 F.2d 80, 81; see Breymann v. Pennsylvania, O. & D. R. Co., 38 F.2d 209, opinion of Hutcheson, Circuit Judge, in Lake v. Texas News Co., 51 F.2d 862, 863, and Waco v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 76 F.2d 470, 471.
See note 4 supra.
Other cases in the Eighth Circuit throw some degree of doubt on the Stewart and Des Moines Elevator & Grain Co. cases, supra, and indicate a disposition to determine whether liability of a defendant under allegations of a complaint is joint or severable by reference to State law. See Harrelson v. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co., 87 F.2d 176, 178; Huffman v. Baldwin, 82 F.2d 5, 8; Watson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 68 F.2d 686, 688, 689. After the decision of this Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit seemingly was of opinion that the question of "joint liability and of the bearing thereof on the question of removability" must be determined by the law of the State. Ervin v. Texas Co., 97 F.2d 806, 809.
See Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 179 U. S. 140; Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, supra, 200 U. S. 220; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U. S. 102, 229 U. S. 112-113.
Norwalk v. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp., supra, 319.