United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. - 226 U.S. 286 (1912)
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., 226 U.S. 286 (1912)
United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Company
Nos. 621, 622
Argued October 24, 1912
Decided December 9, 1912
226 U.S. 286
In view of continuity of operation, manner of compensation for, and performance of, services in connection with interstate transportation, the Union Stock Yard & Transit Company and the Chicago Junction Railway Company are subject to the terms of the Act to Regulate Commerce and must conform to its requirements in regard to filing tariff and also desist from unlawful discriminations to shippers.
The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Elkins and Hepburn Acts, extends to all terminal facilities and instrumentalities.
Service that is performed wholly in one state is still subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce if it is a part of interstate commerce.
The duties of a common carrier in the transportation of livestock begin with their delivery to be loaded and end only after unloading and delivery, or offer of delivery, to the consignee. Covington Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128.
The character of the service rendered in regard to carriage of interstate freight, and not the manner in which the goods are billed, determines whether the commerce is interstate or not, and so held that, although neither the Stock Yard Company nor the Junction Railway Company issues through bills of lading, still, as the goods handled are in transit from one state to another, both corporations are engaged in interstate commerce.
Where two corporations, the controlling stock of both of which is owned by one holding company, operate jointly, one handling only the stockyard business and the other the business of transferring and switching cars containing freight in interstate transit, both are to be deemed railroads within the terms of the Act to Regulate Commerce and are subject to its requirements.
While the Act to Regulate Commerce excludes transportation wholly within a state, a corporation owning a railroad and doing other business in connection with freight in interstate carriage cannot, by leasing the railroad to another company for a share of the profit, exempt itself from the operation of the law.
A contract by an interstate carrier by railroad to pay a part of the cost of the plant of one of its shippers who agrees only to handle goods moved by it held in this case to be an illegal discrimination and rebate under the Act to Regulate Commerce.
A shipper receiving a bonus from the carrier for erecting a plant on the line of the carrier has an undue advantage over a shipper not receiving any bonus or a smaller bonus.
It is the object of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins Act to prevent favoritism by any means or device whatsoever, and to prohibit all practices running counter to the purpose of placing all shippers upon equal terms.
192 F. 330 affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The facts, which involve the application of §§ 2, 6 and 20, of the Interstate Commerce Act, and of § 1 of the Elkins Act, to the Union Stock Yard & Transit Company of Chicago and the Chicago Junction Railway Company, are stated in the opinion.