Illinois ex Rel. McNichols v. PeaseAnnotate this Case
207 U.S. 100 (1907)
U.S. Supreme Court
Illinois ex Rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100 (1907)
Illinois ex Rel. McNichols v. Pease
Argued October 16, 17, 1907
Decided November 18, 1907
207 U.S. 100
Habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding for determining whether one held under an extradition warrant is a fugitive from justice, and he should be discharged if he shows by competent evidence, overcoming the presumption of a properly issued warrant, that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state.
A faithful, vigorous enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to fugitives from justice is vital to the harmony and welfare of the states, and provisions of the Constitution should not be so narrowly interpreted as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find a permanent asylum in the territory of another state. Appleyard v. Massachusetts,203 U. S. 222.
A person held in custody as a fugitive from justice under an extradition warrant in proper form which shows upon its face all that is required by law to be shown as a prerequisite to its being issued should not be discharged unless it clearly and satisfactorily appears that he is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Where the requisition is based on an indictment for a crime committed on a certain day, without specifying any hour, the accused does not overcome the prima facie case by proof that he was not at the place of the crime for a part of that day, the record not disclosing the hour of the crime and it appearing that the accused might have been at the place named during a part of the day.
On writ of error to review a final judgment in habeas corpus proceedings,
this court must determine by the record whether the state court erred, and its decision cannot be controlled or affected by an apparent admission of defendant in error that certain affidavits annexed to the petition were used without objection as evidence.
This Court takes judicial knowledge of facts known to every one as to the distance between two neighboring cities and the time necessary to travel from one to the other.
The facts are stated in the opinion.