District of Columbia v. HuttonAnnotate this Case
143 U.S. 18 (1892)
U.S. Supreme Court
District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U.S. 18 (1892)
District of Columbia v. Hutton
Argued January 12, 1892
Decided February 1, 1892
143 U.S. 18
Section 354 of Rev.Stat.Dist.Columb., providing that
"No person shall be appointed to office, or hold office in the police force [of the District of Columbia] who cannot read and write the English language, or who is not a citizen of the United States, or who shall ever have been indicted and convicted of crime, and no person shall be appointed as policeman or watchman who has not served in the Army or Navy of the United States and received an honorable discharge"
was repealed by the Act of June 11, 1875, "providing a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia." 20 Stat. 102, c. 180.
Ecklof v. District of Columbia,135 U. S. 240, affirmed as to the point that the Act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 102, c. 180, supplied to the District of Columbia for the first time a permanent form of government in the nature of a Constitution.
United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, quoted and applied to the points: (1) that when there are two acts on the same subject, effect is to be given to both, if possible; (2) that when two acts on the same subject are repugnant, the later operates to repeal the earlier to the extent of the repugnancy, and (3) that a later act covering the whole subject of an earlier one and embracing new provisions showing that it was intended as a substitute for the earlier act operates as a repeal of that act.
When a later act operates as a repeal of an earlier act of Congress, a subsequent recognition of it by Congress as a subsisting act will not operate to prevent the repeal.
The Court stated the case as follows:
This was an action by Harry S. Hutton against the District of Columbia to recover the sum of $182.50, with interest, alleged to be due him for salary as a member of the metropolitan police force of the District from June 6, 1890, to August 20th of the same year.
The defendant filed a special plea in bar admitting plaintiff's appointment on the police force at the salary specified in the declaration, and also his faithful performance of the duties required of him in that position for the time for which he
claimed pay, but setting up by way of avoidance that he ought not to recover because, at the time of his appointment, he had never served in the Army or Navy of the United States, which service it was alleged was and is a condition precedent to legal appointment on the police force.
To this plea the plaintiff filed a demurrer which set up (1) that the statute relied upon in the plea had been repealed and that there was no such statute in force in the District of Columbia, and (2) that the appointment of the plaintiff on the police force, and the acceptance of his services as such officer by the defendant, entitled him to recover for such services.
The demurrer was certified to the Supreme Court of the District in general term, to be heard there in the first instance, and, having been overruled, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount sued for. The opinion of the court below, in advance of the official reports, will be found in volume 19, Washington Law Reporter 386. The District has prosecuted a writ of error.
The single question in the case is whether § 354 of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia, prescribing the qualifications of persons eligible for appointment on the police force, was repealed by the Act of June 11, 1878, 20 St. 102, c, 180.
To understand fully the nature of this question, a brief summary of the legislation of Congress respecting the government of the District to Columbia, and especially with regard to the District police, since 1861 will be found useful, if not indispensable. By the Act of August 6, 1861, 12 St. 320, c. 62, the District of Columbia was constituted a "Metropolitan Police District," and the police affairs thereof were put under the control and management of a board of police consisting of the Mayors of Washington and Georgetown and five commissioners of police, to be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This board was invested with plenary powers respecting the police affairs of the District in all particulars, and the act established a complete system of police. The eighth section,
among other things, prescribed qualifications for holding any office on the police force by providing therein as follows:
"No person shall be so appointed to office, or hold office in the police force aforesaid, who cannot read and write the English language, or who is not a citizen of the United States, or who shall ever have been indicted and convicted of crime."
Shortly after the close of the war, an additional qualification, for the benefit of the honorably discharged soldiers and sailors of the United States who had participated in that great struggle was prescribed for those holding office on the force. The General Appropriation Act of March 2, 1867, 14 St. 440, 457, c. 166, in its first section provided that
"hereafter no person shall be appointed as policeman or watchman [in the metropolitan police for the District of Columbia] who has not served in the Army or Navy of the United States and received an honorable discharge."
These provisions respecting the qualifications of an officer on the police force were carried into the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia, enacted at the first session of the 43rd Congress, and are there embodied in § 354. That section provides as follows:
"No person shall be appointed to office or hold office in the police force who cannot read and write the English language or who is not a citizen of the United States or who shall ever have been indicted and convicted of crime, and no person shall be appointed as policeman or watchman who has not served in the Army or Navy of the United States and received an honorable discharge."
During all this period and up till 1878, the police affairs of the District remained under the control of the Metropolitan Police Board established by the act of 1861. In the meantime, however, the other governmental affairs of the District had undergone several changes. By the Act of February 21, 1871, 16 St. 419, c. 62, a territorial government was established for the District, the general administration of affairs being committed to a governor and a legislative assembly. This territorial system of government, however, did not last long. The act establishing it was repealed in 1874, and the repealing
act vested the affairs of the District in a commission consisting of three persons, to be appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This commission was invested with large and ample powers for the administration of the general affairs of the District, but had no power or authority in matters relating to the schools or to the police. With respect, however, to the appointment and removal from office of persons employed in other capacities, and those officers themselves, it provided, in § 2, as follows:
"Said commissioners are hereby authorized to abolish any office, to consolidate two or more offices, reduce the number of employees, remove from office, and make appointments to any office authorized by law."
Act of June 20, 1874, 18 St. 116, c. 337.
Affairs remained thus until 1878. On the 11th of June of that year, an act was passed entitled "An act providing a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia." 20 St. 102, c. 180. This act continued in force the main provisions of the act of 1874, enlarged the power and authority of the commissioners in some respects, especially with regard to the schools and the police, and retained the provision respecting officers, above quoted, from the act of 1874. Its sixth section is as follows:
"That from and after the first day of July, 1878, the board of metropolitan police and the board of school trustees shall be abolished, and all the powers and duties now exercised by them shall be transferred to the said commissioners of the District of Columbia, who shall have authority to employ such officers and agents, and to adopt such provisions as may be necessary to carry into execution the powers and duties devolved upon them by this act. . . ."
The court below held that the section just quoted had the effect of repealing § 354 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District, prescribing certain qualifications for officers and members of the police force, and gave to the commissioners full power and authority to appoint to such offices whoever they might choose under such regulations as they might adopt.
Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.