Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co.
121 U.S. 118 (1887)

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U.S. Supreme Court

Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 121 U.S. 118 (1887)

Grant v. Phoenix Life Insurance Company

Argued March 25, 1887

Decided April 4, 1887

121 U.S. 118

Syllabus

In a suit in equity to enforce trust deeds, a receiver appointed to receive rents and to lease unrented property may apply to the court for directions in regard to the expenditure of funds in his hands as receiver.

The reference of a suit in equity by the Special Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the General Term for hearing in the first instance does not deprive the Special Term of authority to afterwards hear such application of the receiver, especially when the General Term has made an order granting leave to the receiver to apply to the Special Term for instructions.

Such an application may be made by the receiver to the Special Term even

Page 121 U. S. 119

after an appeal to this Court from the final decree of the General Term, which operates as a supersedeas.

An order of the General Term remanding to the Special Term a petition of the receiver that a tenant may attorn to him, for inquiry into the facts and action on the petition is an interlocutory order and not appealable to this Court.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

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